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Only remember that the spirit of the snake, of the lion, is your spirit. 
For it is only from yourself that you are acquainted with spirit at all. 
Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-16, p. 85e.
Prominent non-speciesist attempts to determine the amount of moral
standing properly attributable to conscious beings argue that certain non-human 
animals should be granted the highest consideration as self-conscious persons.1 
Most of these theories also include a lesser moral standing for the sentient, or 
merely conscious, non-person. Thus, the standard approach has been to advocate
a two-tiered theory—'sentience' or 'consciousness' and 'self-consciousness' or
'personhood'. While the first level seems to present little interpretative difficulty, 
the second has recently been criticized as a rather obscurantist label.2 For it 
would seem, both on empirical and conceptual grounds, that self-
consciousness/personhood comes in degrees. If we accept that we should treat
equal interests equally, at the very least there do seem to be interests that, say, 
the ordinary human adult possesses, such as making and keeping resolutions,
that other arguably self-conscious beings, e.g., apes passing the mirror self-
recognition test, do not possess.3 And such interests are not merely novel but
morally significant since they represent an entire order of capacities for self-
consciousness, namely, self-determination.  
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Similarly, there do seem to be morally relevant differences in the capacity 
for self-consciousness lower down the scale, say, between apes and monkeys.4 
Furthermore, there is no clear dividing line even between the self-conscious and 
the merely sentient, for unless we limit self-consciousness to those beings who
can in fact make and keep resolutions—which seems much too stringent—there
is no other level of consciousness at which the concept may not be applicable to a 
lesser degree, except perhaps at the most primitive level of awareness. And even
then, it would have to represent absolutely no self-consciousness whatsoever, 
i.e., the inability to sense any divide between self and non-self—a consciousness 
not only difficult to imagine, but unlikely even to exist. If these observations are 
at all revealing, they indicate that the two-tiered model is inadequate. This is the
view I will support here, replacing the standard dichotomy with what I hope to
show is a more accurate seven-tiered account of cognitive moral standing5 
adaptable to all three major perspectives of moral reasoning, namely, 
utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics. 
A Preliminary Sketch 
Minds are essentially mirrors or microcosms of the world. And the more 
they accurately reflect of it, the more they can accomplish.  Thus, it would seem 
to follow that the degree to which any given mind is morally relevant depends 
on the degree to which it is able to accurately represent the world and thereby 
successfully navigate through it. Obviously, different species will accomplish this
in different ways. For example, some will possess different or even more sensory 
perceptions than others. However, my task here is not to present an exhaustive
list of mental aptitude. Rather, it is to highlight those cognitive capacities that
should be categorized as morally relevant, namely, that of self-interest itself, as 
well as those which carry out its further development, multiplication, and 
refinement across any given experiential continuum. The latter seem largely 
dependent upon the extent of one's ability to communicate, first of all, emotions,
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then preferences, and ultimately propositions. Thus, the overall hierarchy of
cognitive moral standing appears to be as follows: 
At its most primitive level, the mind begins to reflect the world through 
the most basic experience of discord or lack of fit, namely, pain. Sentience thus
constitutes the very first level of awareness, establishing mind's first degree of 
moral relevance. The second level of reflection, and thus of moral relevance, is 
manifested through the capacity of expression, i.e., pain or pain-avoidance 
behavior such as aimless crying or screaming. At this level, the mind gains the
ability to reveal its pain to others. At these first two levels, the mind only reacts 
to basic needs, and thus does not possess the ability to choose between different 
ways of satisfying them. It thus does not possess volition.6 
The third level targets a specific deliverance from actual or future pain, 
say, by expressing an emotion such as anger with intent to thereby bring about a 
certain desired state of affairs as opposed to another. It is hence essentially an 
expressive use behavior. At this level, the mind thus acquires a rudimentary 
capacity of social coordination and manipulation requiring a minimal degree of 
volition, i.e., the ability to perceive at least two different options for satisfying a 
given desire, and to choose one over the other.7 This level of awareness thus 
includes a certain degree of what is commonly referred to as 'object permanence,'
i.e., the ability to acknowledge the continued existence of objects after they have 
moved outside one's field of vision. The representational capacities of levels two 
and three are merely expressive and so consist entirely of 'intrinsic intentionality' 
since their expressive behaviors themselves embody the very emotions being 
communicated and therefore need no translation. 
The fourth level however, begins to afford actual conventional 
representation or 'derived intentionality' of a desired or undesired experience. An 
example might be a dog's taking his master's utterance of a specific word and/or 
brandishing of a leash as a suggestion to go outdoors. Here the mind is learning 
entirely conventional associations, e.g., between a word and/or an object and an 
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activity, which fully warrants the term 'representation.' Thus at this point, some 
species may acquire the capacity to learn rudimentary tool use behavior. The 
fifth level actually makes novel use of conventional representation to obtain a
given end, say, a pig ringing a bell to attract human attention to an imminent
danger or threat. Thus at this level, the mind gains a limited ability to establish 
new conventional associations, which may include new tool-use behavior. 
The sixth level is that of propositional use, i.e., the employment of
grammatical language. Thus far, an increasing number of Apes such as Koko the
gorilla and Washoe the chimpanzee seem to have learned a significant degree of 
syntactical proficiency from humans. And finally, the seventh level is that of 
temporal reference, i.e., the use of propositional language for referring to a state of
affairs temporally far-removed from the one in which the utterance takes place. 
This capacity is necessary for making full discursive use of hypotheticals and
counterfactuals by assessing and evaluating possible outcomes, possible 
wrongdoings and possible gains.8 At this level, one is able to entertain different 
reasons for acting—the main pre-requisite for possessing intentional volition, i.e., 
will. It is thus only at this point that full autonomy is possible.9 
These tiers can now be outlined according to the following diagram10: 
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1. Sentience
Sentience, awareness, or consciousness11 is the most fundamental 
cognitive requirement for moral standing. Without it, pain and pleasure are 
impossible, which for utilitarians means that there is simply "nothing to be taken 
into account."12 From this point of view, the notion of cognitive moral standing is 
hence plainly redundant. The deontological and virtue-ethical perspectives may 
however allow the bar to be placed lower if a good case can be made that non-
sentient organisms may nevertheless qualify as ‘ends in themselves’ by merely 
being alive.13 And though this criterion may satisfy certain deontologists,
sympathetic virtue ethicists would place as much or more importance on 
showing that we obtain greater happiness by treating such life forms with moral
consideration. To this condition, preference utilitarians would not assent, for 
although it would seem that happiness is being maximized, they would view 
such happiness as irrational—a frame of mind that tends not to maximize 
happiness. Virtue ethicists however may not see this attitude as irrational if they
agree with those deontologists who do not consider sentience as necessary for
having interests. Ultimately, these two groups may in fact succeed in convincing 
preference utilitarians that considering non-sentient ends as morally relevant in 
themselves does indeed benefit us intrinsically. If so, preference utilitarians
would thereby have to modify their theory to appropriately allow for what 
might be called ‘non-sentient utility’. Although the theory of moral standing 
advanced in this essay begins with sentience, it is not intended to support the
utilitarian position that sentience is all that is of account. It is rather to stake out a
field of discourse in philosophy of mind that is just as relevant to deontology and
virtue ethics as it is to utilitarianism. 
At the first level of awareness, the mind is entirely passive. It does
however succeed in representing, through the experience of pain, a very small 
part of reality as discord or lack of fit. Hence, the most rudimentary degree of
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self-consciousness might be present even here—as the mere experience of a 
divide or gulf between self and non-self. For pain can only be rectified by a 
corrective action of a subject upon an object. So for example, if and when a late-
term fetal mind feels pain, say, of hunger/thirst, the pain itself might seem as a 
foreign object and its remedy—the satiation of hunger/thirst, perhaps coupled 
with a soft melody and caress, would thus also seem to come from outside the 
suffering self. Hence, the experiential divide between self and non-self is at least 
made possible, if not in fact realized, by the most primitive experience of pain,
and is reinforced by the experience of remedy. 
2. Expression
Immediately beyond the mere capacity for pain is the capacity for pain 
behavior. While it surely seems conceivable for pain to exist without any capacity 
for pain behavior, it should be acknowledged that it remains entirely unclear 
how that phenomenon could ever be unmistakably confirmed. Although certain 
physiological events necessarily indicative of pain could occur without any 
behavioral indication being manifested, this would still not qualify as direct 
evidence of consciousness. The distinction is nonetheless relevant both 
metaphysically and ethically, though it would seem to remain, paradoxically, 
indeterminable. 
At this second level, the mind is able to reveal its pain to others through 
the expression of characteristic pain behaviors such as grimacing, crying, and 
screaming. It thereby gains a valuable asset likely to help it survive by revealing 
its needs to those who might alleviate it.14 Although there could already be 
physiological indicators of needs in place, such as shivering, trembling, writhing 
etc., these are essentially physical since they can be present even in the non-
conscious state of coma. Thus, unlike mere physiological indicators, the
conscious expression of pain is an authentic mental state.  
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A mind's mere capacity for expression is rather aimless since it only 
reveals a basic need without targeting or discriminating between alternate means 
of satisfaction. The further ability to target specific goals arises at the next level, 
that of expressive use. Thus, since the merely expressive mind only makes rather 
generalized gestures of dissatisfaction, it can only contain the most primitive
degree of self-consciousness, if indeed any at all. In this respect, it is on the same 
level as the merely sentient mind, which at best only reflects a discord or lack of 
fit between self and non-self. Nevertheless, the expressive mind does afford
greater moral relevance than bare sentience since it actually invites the world to 
interact with it. In so doing, it gains the capacity to effect considerable influence 
on the emotive lives of others through the mere display of its limited behavioral 
repertoire. 
3. Expressive Use 
Beyond mere need is the capacity of volition, i.e., goal-directed behavior,
which manifests itself most primitively in the employment of expressive 
behavior as alternate means to satisfy desire. At this level, the mind is able to 
exercise a small degree of social coordination and manipulation by, say, 
engaging in threatening, evasive, submissive, or complicit behavior. In such 
cases, the mind begins to acquire the ability to perceive more than a single means 
of satisfying a desire and to choose one over another. In so doing, it goes beyond
the mere expressive representation of a certain intrinsic intentional content, say, 
hunger, replacing it with a different intrinsic intentional content, say, anger. 
Thus, its behavioral repertoire becomes increasingly complex, revealing at least 
the most rudimentary employment of reason. 
At this point, the mind must be able to acknowledge at least to some 
extent, the continued existence of objects outside its own field of perception. As 
most any parent today can tell you, this capacity, known as ‘object permanence’
usually arises in human infants during the first year. It allows them to continue
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looking for a toy which has disappeared under a blanket and for much more
complex forms of play such as ‘peekaboo’ etc. This capacity seems present in 
various forms and to varying degrees in most species. It permits animals to hide 
food away and return to it, build nests, etc. And since it is usually embedded 
within the communicative capacity of expression, it affords a significant degree
of awareness and influence. Thus, at the more primitive level, an animal such as 
a squirrel or crow may first attempt to intimidate, or even distract a possible
competitor before reaching directly for, or even looking directly at, a desired 
object. And at the more elevated pre-linguistic levels, apes for example are 
widely known to engage in rather elaborate forms of deceit through various 
expressive behaviors such as exaggerated screaming, aloofness, ostentatiously 
looking into the distance, etc.15 In most cases, such more complex skills tend to 
occur farther up the scale of cognitive moral standing. Nevertheless, there are
likely to be varying degrees of cognitive ability within each of the broad tiers of
moral standing advanced here. Because of these differences, many of which will 
appear even between members of a single species, we should always err on the 
side of caution when attempting to determine the amount of moral standing 
properly attributable to a any particular mind. Thus, any given mind need only 
minimally satisfy the relevant criteria for placement into the highest possible tier 
of moral standing. 
4. Representation
A mind can be said to ‘represent’ when it can make conventional 
associations that go beyond intrinsic intentionality. As stated above, merely 
expressive meanings are not conventional. Conversely, the ability to take an 
object or word to represent a certain action, series of actions, or state of affairs is
to represent an entirely conventional association, commonly referred to a 
‘derived intentionality.’16 At this point, the mind gains a powerful capacity for 
mirroring the world since it is able to comprehend and engage in primitive forms 
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of linguistic activity.  An animal may thus learn to use a tool as sea otters do
when eating shellfish,17 or respond to specific calls in specific ways as vervet
monkeys do when different predators are seen or heard. Or a dog might simply 
bring its master a leash with the intention of communicating its desire to go out
for a walk. 
At this level, the mind can only learn certain conventional associations
and then make use of them in relatively determined ways. It thus cannot 
establish entirely new conventions of its own volition. It acquires novel 
associations primarily by observing the behavior of others. This may seem to beg 
the chicken/egg question of how conventions arose in the first place. Although 
this is a fascinating and entirely open question it must not always be question 
begging. If for example we are asking how sea otters first leaned to pry open 
clams with flattened stones, we could explain the phenomenon by imagining 
countless generations of trial and error tampering. It need not be the case that at 
one miraculous point in time, some particularly crafty sea otter simply thought 
really hard and quickly proceeded to open a clam with a flattened stone. Indeed, 
this kind of explanation would seem extravagant since if sea otters generally had 
the cognitive capacity to generate novel conventional associations of their own 
volition, they would presumably exhibit more complex behaviors of the kind
found at the next tier. My argument of course does not rely on any empirical 
claim that particular animals fall into particular tiers of cognitive ability. Sea 
otters may in fact exhibit a ‘level five’ cognitive capacity, provided the adequate 
evidence is given. 
5. Representational Use 
This level of cognition occurs when a mind goes beyond simply 
acknowledging, repeating or reproducing specific conventional associations.
Instead, it may of its own volition establish entirely novel derived-intentional
meanings. At this point however, thinking is not fully discursive. It thus does not 
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entertain fully formed propositions. Nevertheless, minds at this level of 
awareness employ tools and/or sounds in new ways. Young apes may for 
example contrive to let out screams of distress without actually feeling the 
associated emotions. They may have simply sought to attract a dominant male to
the peaceful scene of another adult ape quietly feeding. Already agitated and
now perplexed, the dominant male will then chase the other adult away from the 
food, thus unwittingly freeing it up for the rather cunning younger ape.18 In this
case, the scream is used in an entirely novel fashion, to achieve an entirely 
different goal, far removed from the genuine expression of pain or distress.  
This level of cognition obviously involves a high degree of rational ability.
It is clear that any mind capable of exercising such volition must be able to
imagine different scenarios and to contrive original techniques, for achieving its
goals, such as fashioning raw materials into new tools or altering existing ones or 
even fashioning new tools with other tools.19 But since this thinking is not fully 
propositional, it cannot entertain sophisticated notions of truth and falsity. It is
thus not able to represent or correct its own mistakes or the mistakes of others 
without relying on mere trial and error with the external world. That is to say, a 
pre-linguistic mind cannot make corrections in its own head. For it only holds
the capacity to mirror the world—not the capacity to mirror its own mirror-
image of the world. 
6. Propositional Use 
The very ability to comprehend propositional language necessarily implies 
the ability to use propositional language.  That is to say, one must be able to 
respond propositionally, thus construct further propositions, which then in turn 
can be responded to, and so on. At this level, the mind possesses a very high 
degree of volition, for it is able to not only establish more complex intentional 
conventions but can discriminate between true and false depictions of the world, 
and communicate them, as such, to others. For example, Koko the gorilla
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regularly corrects others’ perceived errors in propositional language even 
without solicitation.20 And when asked, Chantek the orangutan often corrects or
improves upon his own language to make his statements more clear to others.21 
It is telling that apes who can correct or improve upon their own language 
do not, as far as current research suggests, do so without being asked. Although 
they do correct others’ language without solicitation, they do not seem to correct 
their own of their own volition. This seems to indicate that they cannot generate 
and entertain counterfactual relations entirely on their own—they must always 
rely, at least in part, on being presented with a possible state of affairs which 
may contradict their own impressions. Thus they cannot produce an entire 
discussion or debate on their own. So although such minds are to some extent 
able to mirror their own mirror-images of the world, they cannot do so
internally. They may seem to speak to themselves, but cannot actually generate, 
entertain, and sort out possible conflicting propositions on their own. Hence, 
they cannot properly be said to possess fully intentional volition, i.e., will. At this 
level, minds therefore still lack full personal autonomy. 
7. Temporal Reference 
In order to exercise and enjoy full personal autonomy, a mind must be 
able to refer propositionally to distinct and distantly-removed points in time. 
Somewhat surprisingly, this capacity seems at present to exist only in humans.22 
Indeed, without temporal reference, it will be impossible to entertain complex 
sequences of cause and effect. And furthermore, as Hauser puts it, one cannot 
make discursive use of hypotheticals and counterfactuals by assessing and 
evaluating possible outcomes, possible wrongdoings and possible gains.23 Hence
one can neither make prospective recommendations, which must necessarily 
refer to states of affairs temporally far-removed from the one in which the
utterance takes place. In short, one cannot decide, commit , or resolve to behave
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in a certain way at any distantly-removed point in time, say, tomorrow, next 
week, or next month. 
Thus, one does not have a will. This is why, as Wittgenstein correctly 
points out, “a dog cannot be a hypocrite, but neither can he be sincere.”24 One 
might however assume that the example of ape deceit given above at tier five 
also indicates the capacity to be sincere. But sincerity requires a good deal more 
than the mere capacity to deceive, namely, the capacity to acknowledge the 
possibility and relative value of insincerity in certain situations, and to willfully 
choose against it in the face of more important considerations and concerns. 
Essentially, it requires the ability to entertain and adopt different reasons for 
acting. 
Hence, only minds at the seventh tier of awareness can genuinely
understand and apply moral imperatives. They may have certain preferences 
and indeed choose between them, but they are not able to entertain, distinguish, 
discriminate, and apply overarching normative principles. This brings us to a 
concluding and centrally important criterion—the capacity for normative
cognizance. Assuming one is at the seventh tier of cognitive moral standing 
implies that one does share a common capacity of normative concern. 
Nevertheless, it is certainly conceivable that a mind could show the highest 
levels of cognitive ability, but be completely morally oblivious, either in 
awareness, concern, or both.  Psychopaths are a case in point. Such normatively 
deficient minds thus cannot obtain the moral standing representative of their 
other cognitive abilities. Similar concerns apply at most of the lower levels of 
cognition outlined above, namely, three through six, in which minds may show 
particularly high or alarmingly low degrees of affective behavior. The murky and 
confounding moral implications of such considerations will ultimately rely on 
the detailed results of empirical investigation.   
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